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COMMENT
JUST COMPENSATION, LAND-USE REGULATION,
AND THE COMPENSABLE TEMPORARY TAKING:
FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH
OF GLENDALE v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
U.S. -,

107 S. CT. 2378 (1987)
INTRODUCTION

The power of eminent domain' and the police power,2 while not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, are incidents of sovereignty, inherent

in the state.' The Takings Clause4 imposes the limitations of "public use"
and "just compensation" on government exercise of the power of eminent
domain. 5 The validity of and justification for land-use regulation flows
I. The power of eminent domain allows government to take private property, subject to the
payment of just compensation, without the owner's consent, J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, I NICHOt.S
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d rev. ed. 1985). The sovereign exercises its power of
eminent domain by instituting condemnation proceedings to effect the taking of property. See United
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,255 (1980). If, however, the government has not pursued affirmatively
its power of eminent domain by condemning property and the owner asserts a taking in fact, the
owner may demand just compensation through an inverse condemnation suit. See id. at 256-57.
2. The police power generally refers to the "inherent power of government to [act] to promote
the public health, safety, welfare[,] or morals." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 398 (3d ed. 1986); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). It also has been defined
more limitedly as "those grants of power to the federal and state government that survive the explicit

limitations found in the Constitution," R. EPSTEIN,

TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 107 (1985), specifically, "control . . . of common law wrongs involving force

and misrepresentation, deliberate or accidental, against other persons, including private nuisances,"
id. at 11l. With regard to eminent domain, the police power has been narrowly construed to mean
"only the power of government to regulate the use of land and property without the payment of
compensation." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, at 398 (emphasis added).
3. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 398-99. The police power is an inherent
power of the state governments. id. at 398 n.2. The federal government, however, subject to
constitutionally enumerated powers, cannot exercise the police power, except with regard to federal
lands. Id. Furthermore, with respect to governing federal lands, the federal government is not one
of enumerated powers. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 2, at 400 n.14.
The Just Compensation Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation"), also referred to as the Eminent Domain Clause or the
Takings Clause, implies the power of eminent domain. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 2, at 399. While state governments may exercise the power of eminent domain "so long as it
does not violate any provision of the Constitution," its exercise by the federal government is valid
only as "necessary and incidental to the exercise of an express power." Id. at 400.
4. See supra note 3.
5. The just compensation limitation on the power of eminent domain was considered an integral
principle of natural justice in early state court cases. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
2, at 399, 400. Thus, although the Fifth Amendment originally bound only the federal government,
state courts implied this limitation on the actions of state government. Id. While the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes federal standards of due process on state interference with private property, it
does not explicitly require either "public use" or "just compensation." The Supreme Court has held
these conditions applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, however, since Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 20.1 (2d ed. 1986); J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at § 11.11.
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from exercise of the police power.'
Although the power of eminent domain and the police power are theoretically distinguishable, they necessarily conflict, or at least interact,

when regulation "goes too far," 7 effecting a taking." While the exercise
of the police power does not necessitate payment of compensation, 9 exercise of the power of eminent domain clearly does."' This dichotomy has
lead to what has been termed "The Taking Issue.""

For the first hundred years after the adoption of the Fifth Amendment,
actual government seizure of property defined the parameters of takings. 2

During the last hundred years, however, actual physical occupation or
appropriation of land has not been required and a taking may be effected
through governmental exercise of the police power.' 3 Although some

authorities question whether a regulatory taking can exist absent actual
governmental occupation or acquisition of a legal interest in the property,"'
the Supreme Court has consistently maintained its prerogative to consider
whether land-use regulation might constitute a compensable taking 5 and
recently in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles (FirstLutheran Church) reaffirmed not only the
concept of regulatory taking but also that of the temporary regulatory
taking. 6 This comment discusses the scope of the Just Compensation
Clause with regard to governmental exercise of the police power in landuse regulation, focusing particularly on issues involving the compensable
6. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5,at 291 & n.8; D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH,
ch. 5 §7 (1986),
7. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.Mahon, Justice Holmes promulgated the general rule that "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking," 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added). The standard to be used in determining whether
a regulation goes "too far," however, remains undefined. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 2, at 406 n.34.
8. See supra note 1.
9. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 398.
10. See supra notes 3 & 5.
11.See generally F BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE passim (1973); R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 1,passim; D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at § 10.7; J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, supra note 2, at § 11.12.
12. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLES & J. BANTA, supra note I I, at 51.
13. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5,at § 10.7; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at § 11.12.
14. See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts,
15 URs. LAW 447, 447-48 (1983); cf. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987)
(invalidating a building permit condition that required recording of a deed restriction granting a
public easement across a portion of the property).
15. E.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 . Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
16. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (hereinafter First Lutheran Church].
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE,
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temporary regulatory taking. Additionally, the First Lutheran Church
decision is analyzed.
BACKGROUND
There are two opposing theories concerning the nature of takings: the
traditional theory, requiring physical invasion or acquisition of an interest
in property, and the modem theory of regulatory takings. In FirstLutheran
Church the Supreme Court formally acknowledged the latter.
Traditional Takings Theory
Originally, takings law required actual physical occupation or appropriation of property by government. 7 The traditional theory holds that
the doctrine of eminent domain is "separate and distinct in both origin
and function from the police power. "'8 Accordingly, while compensation
is required for a taking related to the power of eminent domain, excessive
regulation through use of the police power, by definition, can never
constitute a Fifth Amendment taking, because "without the authority and
consent to compensate[, it] is ultra vires sovereign power and [can be]
challenged [only] on the basis of its validity."' 9 Thus, the relief available
consists solely of invalidation of the offending regulation. 2'
The per se regulatory taking,2" resulting from regulation which allows
the government or a third party the right of permanent physical invasion
of private property, is a modern embodiment of the traditional takings
theory. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. the Supreme
Court distinguished "permanent physical occupation, . . . physical invasion short of . . .occupation, and .. .regulation that merely restricts
the use of property," 22 and "affirmed the traditional rule that a permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking[,] . . . qualitatively more
intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation." 3 Tak17. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J.BANTA, supra note II, at 51. Justice Harlan's decision in
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), illustrates the position that the Takings Clause requires
actual permanent government acquisition of property. See D. HAGMAN & J.JUERGENSMEYER, supra
note 5, at 318. The Mugler decision reflected the general view that "mere use regulation never
necessitated compensation," J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 402, holding that
prohibiting the use of a brewery to manufacture liquor "cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit." Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
18. Freilich, supra note 14, at 461.
9. Id. at 461-62. See, e.g., D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at § 10.7.
20. See Freilich, supra note 14, at 461-62; D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at
324.
2 1. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 408. This concept has also been referred
to as the "permanent physical invasion" test. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 323.
22. 458 U.S. 419, 430 (1982).
23. Id. at 441.
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ings have also been found with nonpermanent, but regular and frequent,

physical invasions of property.24

Modern Regulatory Takings Theory
The modem position defines the police power more narrowly, as "only
the power of government to regulate the use of land and property without
the payment of compensation." 25 According to this theory, first propounded by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, if regulation goes "too far" it becomes, for all practical purposes, an exercise
of eminent domain, subject to the Just Compensation Clause.26 The distinction between the police power and the Takings Clause, thus, is a

question of degree, with fairness requiring that "when [regulation] reaches
a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise

of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 27

Although Pennsylvania Coal stands for the proposition that excessive

regulation can constitute a taking, because of the actual parties involved
it resulted in the invalidation of a state statute, rather than an award of
compensation.2" Indeed, in the intervening years, various authorities have
pronounced it wrongly decided, merely speaking metaphorically of the
Takings Clause, and pure dictum.29 Additionally, federal courts and a
majority of state supreme courts through the 1970s and early '80s have
not found a compensable regulatory taking. 3 ° The California Supreme
Court even declared that actions alleging a regulatory taking could not
ask for compensation in inverse condemnation, but are limited to declaratory relief or mandamus. 3 Thus, although the theory that excessive
24. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v, United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
25. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 398.
26. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
27. Id. at 413. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 403.
28. 260 U.S. at 414. The state was not a party in Pennsylvania Coal. The suit was instituted by
a homeowner seeking injunctive relief against the mining company. Id. at 412. The company
appealed, and the United States Supreme Court invalidated the injunction granted the homeowner
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 414,
29. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supranote 5, at 319 (citing F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J.
BANTA, supra note 11, at ch. 8; Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings and Other Myths, I J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 105 (1985); Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 209-10 (1984) [hereinafter The White River Junction Manifesto).
30. Freilich, supra note 14, at 448 & nn.3-5.
31. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, -, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal, Rptr. 372,...
(1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Agins court held that "a landowner
alleging that a zoning ordinance has deprived him of substantially all use of his land may attempt
through declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate the ordinance as excessive regulation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment[, but] he may not ... elect to sue in inverse condemnation." Id. at
,
598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
.
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regulation could constitute a taking requiring compensation was convincingly argued in Pennsylvania Coal, the traditional takings theory that
there could never be a regulatory taking seemed predominant in practice.
Justice Brennan's 1981 dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City
of San Diego,32 however, represented a reaffirmation of Justice Holmes's
position on regulatory takings.33 The majority found the Court lacking
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits because the lower court had not
yet determined the issue of whether a taking had occurred. 4 Justice
Brennan believed, however, that in applying the California Supreme Court's
rule in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 5 the lower court found, and could only
find, that "the city's exercise of its police power, however arbitrary or
excessive, could not as a matter offederal constitutionallaw constitute
a 'taking."36 This he held completely contradictory to the precedents of
the Court,37 as police power regulation can constitute a taking.3" Furthermore, "once a court establishes that there was a regulatory 'taking,'
the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected
the 'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." 3 9 Thus, Justice Brennan's
San Diego Gas dissent expanded the Holmes regulatory taking to include
the compensable temporary regulatory taking. Though adopted by various
jurisdictions, the San Diego Gas dissent was vigorously criticized, as had
been Pennsylvania Coal, by those authorities who held that no regulatory
action could constitute a taking."
The Supreme Court formally adopted the Brennan San Diego Gas
dissent in First Lutheran Church.4' Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist found the constitutional question of appropriate remedy for an
32. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981).
33. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined in the dissent. Justice Rehnquist, while joining
with the majority, stated in his concurring opinion that absent concern over the issue of final
judgement, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting
opinion." Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The majority, too, noted that "the federal
constitutional aspects of [the California Court of Appeal's holding that a monetary remedy was not
available] are not to be cast aside lightly." Id. at 633. Subsequently, various lower federal and state
courts adopted the Brennan dissent. E.g., D. HAGMAN & J.JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 322.
34. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 623.
35. 24 Cal. 3d. 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affdon other grounds. 447 U.S.
255 (1980). See supra note 31.
36. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 647 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). The precedents are discussed id. at 647-53 (Brennan,
J.,dissenting).
38. Id. at 653 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

39. id. (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
40. D. HAGMAN & J.JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 322-23, 324; see, e.g., Freilich, supra note
14; The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 29, at 193.
41. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
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alleged taking to be properly before the Court for adjudication.' First
addressing the language of the Fifth Amendment, the Court determined
that the Takings Clause, while not prohibiting or restricting the eminent
domain power of government to take private property,43 does limit the
flexibility and freedom of such government action.' The constitutional
requirement of just compensation imposes a self-executing, affirmative
obligation or duty on government to pay if its actions do result in a
taking.45 This command of the Just Compensation Clause must be met,
notwithstanding policy considerations, such as the need for freedom in
and the chilling effect of just compensation on land-use planning and
regulation.'e
The Court then stated that takings need not be "permanent and irrev' and temporary
ocable," 47
takings are "not different in kind from permanent takings." While government, not the property owner, retains
the option of deciding whether to amend or abandon the excessive regulation or proceed with the taking, compensation is required for the period
that the property is taken. 49 Thus, "where the government's activities
have already worked a taking[, whether temporarily or permanentlyJ no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.""
42. Id. at 2383-85. It was due to concerns of finality that the Court had been unable to reach this
issue in preceding cases. Id. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561,
2568-69 (1986), Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186 (1985), and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 631-32 (1981), the
Court found determination of any taking to be of factual dispute, necessitating further administrative
action or final judgement or decree at the state level. No taking was found in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
The Court found the posture of the case in FirstLutheran Church, however, to be quite different,
isolating the remedial question, 107 S.Ct. at 2384. Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, alleged that
a county ordinance denied all use of its property. Id.; see infra note 172. Defendants had moved to
strike that allegation as "entirely immaterial and irrelevant," in light of the California Supreme
Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, and the trial court had granted that motion. First
Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2382. The California Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 2384. It
assumed that the complaint sought damages for an uncompensated taking and held that Agins limited
the remedy to nonmonetary relief, with no damages recoverable unless the ordinance were enforced
after having been declared unconstitutional. id. The California Supreme Court denied review. Id.
at 2383. Thus, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of "whether the Just
Compensation Clause requires the government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings." Id. at
2385. It did not, however, rule on the merits. Id. at 2384-85; see infra text accompanying notes
165-203.
43. FirstLutheran Church, 107 S.Ct. at 2385, 2386 n.9.
44. Id. at 2389.
45. Id. at 2386.
46. Id. at 2387 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979)).
47. Id. at 2388 (quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657
(1981) (Brennan, J.,dissenting)).
48. Id.at 2388.
49. Id.at 2389.
50. Id,
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WHEN DOES LAND-USE REGULATION EFFECT A TAKING?
In applying the Just Compensation Clause to land-use regulation, the
threshold issue is whether the regulation effects a taking. Limited standards for identifying a regulatory taking have evolved from modem takings theory. If a taking is found, the issues of public use and justification
also must be addressed.
Regulatory Takings Standards
While FirstLutheran Church validates the modem theory of permanent
and temporary regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate
a clear standard for determining when excessive regulation constitutes a
taking. 5' The question of when regulation "goes too far"'52 has not advanced
much beyond Justice Holmes's criterion of degree or "magnitude,"' 53 and
the Court's rulings have been described as a "crazy-quilt pattern" 54 and
a "muddle." 5 5 It is against this uncertain background that potential litigants must pursue their causes.
The Court itself has acknowledged that this issue "has proved to be a
problem of considerable difficulty," not conducive to development of
"any 'set formula,"' resulting in "ad hoc, factual inquiries. "56 "[Sleveral
factors [of] particular significance" 57 have been identified, however. These
include the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner, 58
particularly the extent of interference with "distinct investment-backed
expectations. "59 These criteria have recently been enunciated in a test for
regulatory taking that "compare[s] the value that has been taken from
the property with the value that remains in the property."' Additionally,
the "character of the government action"" is of relevant consideration,
with physical invasion by government much more likely to lead to a
51. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 407 n.34. The First Lutheran Church
Court did note, however, that normal administrative processing delays in condemnation proceedings
or governmental decision making with regard to land-use regulations are "incidents of ownership"
and not constitutional takings, 107 S. Ct. at 2388 (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S.
271, 285 (1939); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980)). What is "normal" in
such instances also awaits Court determination.
52. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
53. Id. at 413.
54. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 63.
55. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
561 (1984).
56. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977).
57. Id. at 124.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
60. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987).
61. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); accord Keystone,
107 S. Ct. at 1244 & n.18.
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finding of taking than interference that merely adjusts "the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good. ,62 These considerations, however, do not greatly aid potential litigants in evaluating
the strength of their cases, and the Court still has much room for clarification in this area. This issue might well be the subject of the next
seminal regulatory takings case. 3
Public Use
The Fifth Amendment explicitly restricts the exercise of the power of
eminent domain to public uses. This limitation was originally viewed
broadly by the Supreme Court, but then narrowed considerably in the
late nineteenth century.65 The twentieth century, however, has seen a
return to an expansive interpretation of the Public Use Clause.'
In Berman v. Parker the Court determined that "[slubject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. "6 7 Additionally,
"[oInce the object is within the authority of [the legislature], the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.""8 The Court
further explained in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff that "[tihe
'public use' requirement is . . .coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. ' Thus, although the Court retains the power of
review, it is "'an extremely narrow' one," '7 and "where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause." 7
That the Court is willing and able to review inverse condemnation
claims asserting defect of public use, however, was recently demonstrated
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.72 While acknowledging that
standards have not been elaborated with regard to what constitutes a
62. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See cases cited supra note 24 and accompanying text.
are undecided are:(1)what type of standard should be employed to
63. "The questions that
determine if a regulatory diminishment in the economic value of property is so great that it should
constitute a taking and (2) whether the government must pay for temporary, though severe, diminishments in value through regulation." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, supra note 2, at 407
n.34. First Lutheran Church addresses the second question. The first has yet to be answered by the
Court.
64. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation") (emphasis added).
65. J.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, supra note 2, at 414-15.
66. See id. at 415-16.
67. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).

68. Id. at 33.
69.
70.
71.
72.

467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
Id. at 241.
107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).

Spring 1988]

LAND-USE REGULATION

legitimate state interest, 73 the Court required that "regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, ...
not that 'the State 'could rationally have decided' the measure adopted

might achieve the State's objective."' 74 Thus, there must be sufficient
nexus between land-use regulation and the asserted public use.
Justification
The scope of the police power, in addition to determining whether a
regulatory taking has occurred, 5 may also provide justification for a taking
and, therefore, negate the just compensation requirement:
Meeting the public use limitation does not allow the state to take
private property without just compensation. Satisfying the police
power limitation, in contrast, does allow the state to take without
compensation. The police power cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted grant of state power to act in the public interest, for then the
exception will overwhelm the [Just Compensation C1lause."6
The existence of an extreme emergency has long been recognized as
sufficient justification for governmental taking and even destruction of
private property, 7 Thus, military actions during war are often held noncompensable. 78 Likewise, regulations addressing extreme wartime
emergencies79 or events occurring under warlike conditions may be excused
as justified."0
Control of public nuisance also justifies takings. 8' One authority has
determined this purpose to be the sole justifiable exercise of police power,
defining its scope as the protection of "individual liberty and private
property against all manifestations of force and fraud.""' Applied strictly,
this theory 3 would allow nonpayment for takings only where the nuisance
physically invades the property of another, regardless of whether the
property interest predates the nuisance or "com[es] to the nuisance." 4
73. Id. at 3146-47.
74. Id. at 3147 n.3 (cites omitted).
75. See supra notes 1-1 and 17-50 and accompanying text.

76. R. EPSTIN, supra note 2, at 109.
77. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 409.
78. Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)).
79. Id. at 410 (citing United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)).
80. Id. (citing Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969)).
81. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
82. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2,at 112. Consent and assumption of the risk are additional affirmative
defenses for takings. Id. at ch. !1.
83. Id. at 112-21.
84. Id. at 118. This theory offers perhaps the most principled explanation of Hadachek v.Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 120-21. It does not elucidate Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), however, as it distinguishes among prevention of harm and conference
of benefits or acts of God. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 116,118. Miller may, in fact, represent the
transmutation of the Just Compensation Clause from a constitutional to a legislative guarantee. Id.
at 115.
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The emergency and public nuisance justifications, however, are often
applied much more loosely in regulatory takings cases." Thus, public
nuisance has been used to justify government condemnation of public
buildings, closure of unlawful businesses, destruction of infected trees,
and restriction of access to hazardous areas, such as those affected by
radioactivity, lava flow, and threat of flood.8 6
WHAT CONSTITUTES JUST COMPENSATION?
The Fifth Amendment mandates that takings be justly compensated. 7
Thus, after the threshold question of whether a land-use regulation effects
a taking has been answered in the affirmative, the issue of just compensation must be addressed. Determination of what constitutes just compensation hinges on the adequacy of the form and the measure of
compensation.
Form of Compensation
One of the principal purposes of the Just Compensation Clause is "to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole. "" Thus, "government action that works a taking of property rights
necessarily implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.""'9 The owner must be made whole by being "put in as good a
position pecuniarily as if [the] property had not been taken."' Just compensation, therefore, is generally monetary, although the Constitution
does not specify its form and the state could theoretically provide it in
whatever form it wished. 9'
Related to the issue of form of compensation is the theory of benefits,
both general and specific, resulting from the exercise of the police power,
as offsets. 92 General benefits deal with the extent to which "restrictions
imposed by . . .general legislation upon the rights of others serve as
' They are implicit
compensation for the property taken." 93
and in kind,
85. See FirstLutheran Church, 107 U.S. 2378, 2391-92 & n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation") (emphasis added). But see supra text accompanying notes 75-86 (Justifiable takings
need not be compensated).
88. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 n.4 (1987) (quoting Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
89. First Lutheran Church, 107 U.S. at 2386 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).

90. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
91. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 195.
92. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at ch. 12; D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note
5, at §20.14.
93. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 195 (emphasis omitted).
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and so long as the property owner receives equal value, explicit compensation is unnecessary, as the owner is supposedly justly compensated
through the working of the statute. 94
Such a trade off of burdens and benefits can occur in large-number
takings involving many individuals, such as taxation, where the balance
between gains and losses is theoretically equivalent or, at least, not greatly
disparate.95 The taking of specific property from particular owners, however, almost always results in detrimental and disproportionate impact,
with the property owner incurring most of the burden and acquiring little
of the total benefit.' As the constitutional requirement is "just" compensation, not "some" compensation, the disproportionate burden of regulation and the extent of benefit received must be addressed.97 The mere
existence of some general benefit is not necessarily sufficient compensation.98 In fact, such benefits are almost always wholly inadequate and,
as they attach to the property itself when the regulation is imposed, their
double consideration results in improper benefit to government. 99
In addition to general police power benefits, special benefits may be
conferred in partial takings due to the use made of the taken portion.'"o
These special benefits include:
those which exceed the general benefit to the public, those which
accrue when the public improvement is located on the privately
owned land upon which the government has condemned an easement,
those which result from a physical improvement on the land....
or those to owners who benefit most.'
There is no agreement as to how to consider such benefits.' 02 Treatment
varies by jurisdiction and ranges from:
1. no consideration of benefits,
2. offset of special benefits against damages to the remaining property,
3. offset of general and special benefits against the remainder,
94. id. at 196. This theory has been carried to its extreme by the suggestion of one commentator
that because a landowner always benefits from regulation, compensation should never be paid and
that the landowner instead owes the government for benefits taken and the adverse impact of
development. Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of Compensation in Land Use Regulatory
Cases, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 621,648 n. 127 (1983) (citing Brooks, The EvaluationofCompensable
Regulations:A Return to Beuscher's Defense of Invalidation, 19 WASH. U. URB. L. ANN. 27, 44
(1980)).
95. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 202.
96. Id. at 202-06, 273.
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. But see Brooks, supra note 94.
99. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 273.
100. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at §20.14.
101. Id. at 626.
102. Id.; Bishop, Cross Examination of Experts and Appraisers, in REAL ESTATE CONDEMNATION:
REcENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEW TRENos 495-97 (S. Searles, ed. 1976).
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4. offset of special benefits against both the remainder and the taken

property, and
5. offset of general and special benefits against both the remainder and

taken portion." 3
As with general benefits," special benefits, are embedded in land values
when regulation is imposed, and should not be considered in the compensation formula. 5
In recent years the concept of "transferable development rights"'"
(TDR's) also has affected form of compensation. TDR's involve the
severance of development potential from regulated land in the form of

development rights that can then be sold.0 7 This system has been suggested as a suitable method of compensation of property owners whose
development rights have been severely restricted, by historic, agricultural,

and open space preservation programs, for instance, and even has been
offered as a replacement for traditional zoning. 0,
Whether TDR's provide adequate compensation remains not only

undecided" ° but, also, questionable."' In the first place, the development

rights must be a property interest owned by the state in order for the state
to grant it as compensation."' If they reside in the state, they were
obtained by zoning regulation from the very owner to whom they are
now tendered as compensation." 2 Additionally, they are compensable to
the owner only if there is a demand for them from other property owners,
which demand is created, again, by the state confiscating their development rights by zoning regulation. "3 Thus, for the TDR system to work,
103.
104.
105.
106.

Bishop, supra note 102, at 495-96.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
Cf. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 273.
See generally Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977); R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 188-90; D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supranote 5, at §§ 11.6, 15.8; J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, supra note 2, at 419.
107. See Bozung, Transferable Development Rights: Compensation for Owners of Restricted
Property, in ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 10.05[21 (J.Gailey, ed. 1984) (construing
Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5 (1976)).
108. See D. HAGMAN & J. Jt ERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at §§ 11.6, 15.8; Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Schnidman, TransferableDevelopment Rights (TOR),
in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTs ch. 23 (D.Hagman & D. Misczynski, eds. 1978). But see R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 188-90; Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies:A Reply to
ProfessorCostonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1976).
109. J.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & . YOUNG, supra note 2, at 419. In Penn CentralTransp. Co. v.
New York City the Court, while acknowledging that TDR's are valuable and "undoubtedly mitigate
.financial
t.
burdens," specifically did not address the issue of just compensation, as no taking
was found, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1977).
110. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 188-90.
111. See id. at 189.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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"rights taken by the state through zoning [must] become property only
when they are conveyed by the state."" 4
Valuation is also problematical. Although in-kind compensation is not
constitutionally prohibited," 5 development rights typically involve contingencies, such as the need for further regulatory approval, that so complicate the situation that it may be impossible to sensibly determine value." 6
Additionally, TDR's are closely associated with the idea of "fair compensation,"" ' 7 rather than the constitutionally mandated "just compensation." "The Fifth Amendment does not allow simply an approximate
compensation but requires 'a full and perfect equivalent for the property
taken.'"""s Thus, the amount of compensation with TDR's may not only
be inordinately difficult to determine, but may well be inherently defective. "9
Measure of Compensation
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Just Compensation Clause as
requiring that the property owner be put in as good a position as if the
property had not been taken. 2 Under this guideline, just compensation
is normally measured by the fair market value of the property at the time
of the taking,' or "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller. " 22
Although basic equitable principles of fairness and indemnity underlie
114. Id. at 190.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
116. R. EPsTEIN, supra note 2, at 190.
117. Costonis, supra note 108.
118. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 150 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
119. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 188.
120. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1978) (quoting Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
121. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1983) (quoting Olson, 292 U.S. at
255); accord Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1983); 564.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. at 511. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at § 20.9; J. NOWAK.
R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 2, at § 11.14.
122. 564.54Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943)); accord Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 10. Fair market value, however, is not the sole
measure of just compensation. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29; accord 564.54 Acres of Land,
441 U.S. at 512; Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 10 n.14. Other measures of valuation may be
called for if market value is "too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest
injustice to owner or public." 50Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting United States v. Commodities
Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)); accord564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506,512 (1978);
Kirby ForestIndus., 467 U.S. at 10n. 14. This is most likely to apply to property traded so infrequently
on the open market, public facilities like roads or sewers, for instance, that fair market price is not
ascertainable. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 513).
In such cases, it is not sufficiently predictable "whether the prices previously paid, assuming there
have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the condemned property." Id. (quoting 564.54
Acres of Land. 441 U.S. at 513).
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the attempt to make the owner whole through fair market valuation, 123
the Court has explicitly acknowledged that this standard, "in some cases
. . . fails fully to indemnify the owner for his losses."' 24 This seeming

discrepancy is accepted and justified by the Court, however, because of
the need to remove subjective elements from the determination of fair
market value and to develop "relatively objective valuation standards" 125
that are clear and easily administered. 26 Thus, any special value that
property may hold for an owner, such as that arising from its adaptability27
to the owner's particular use, may not be included in fair market value.'
Value may differ greatly between owner and taker, but it is only transferable objective values, not nontransferable subjective values deriving
attachment to particular
from the owner's unique need for or idiosyncratic
21
compensated.
be
must
that
property,
Value is not an inherent characteristic of property," but "pertains to
the relationship between a thing desired and a potential purchaser.' "
Four factors comprise the value relationship: desire, which may or may
not be accompanied by need; utility, the ability to satisfy desire; scarcity;
and effective purchasing power, or transferability. "' Additionally, four
external forces influence real estate values:
1. social forces related to human instinct, ideals, and standards, including population growth and decline, shifts in population density,
changing family size and composition, and attitudes toward architectural design and utility;
2. economic forces related directly or indirectly to purchasing power,
including commercial and industrial trends, employment trends and
levels, price levels, interest rates, and tax burdens;
3. governmental controls created by political forces, including zoning
laws, building codes, rent controls, and monetary policy; and
4. physical or environmental forces created by nature or man, including
climate, topography, natural resources, soil characteristics
32 and conservation, transportation facilities, and flood control.
The value of real property, then, is "the present value of the future benefits
123. See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 516-17.
124. Kirby ForestIndus., 467 U.S. at 10 n. I5. "[This divergence from full indemnification does
not violate the Fifth Amendment."- 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 514.
125. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511, 516 (1978).
126. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1983).
127. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
128. Id. at 512-13 (quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1948)).
129. TExTBooK REVISION SuBCOMMrTEE, AM. INST. OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL

OF REAL ESTATE 22 (7th ed. 1976) [hereinafter THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE].
130. Id. at 21.

131. Id. at 21-22.
132. Id. at 3-4.
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forthcoming from the property,"' 33 as affected by these factors and forces.
The market data approach, the cost approach, and the income approach
are the methods most commonly used to determine the fair market value
of real property."34 Each is generally accepted in fundamental appraisal
procedure.' 35 When possible, all three approaches are utilized and compared to each other as checks in the final determination of fair market
value. " One or more methods, however, may not be particularly suited
for use with a certain property or type of property. For instance, the
market data approach would be impractical for valuing specialized property, such as a garbage disposal plant; vacant land cannot be valued by
the cost approach; and personal residences may only rarely be valued by
the income approach.' 37
The market data approach arrives at value through the comparison and
adjustment of recent sales prices of similar properties sold in the same
or a similar market."' Five steps are necessary to determine fair market
value with the market data method:
1. Research the market to identify similar properties for which pertinent sales, listings, offerings, and/or rental data is available.
2. Qualify the prices as to terms, motivating forces, and bona fide
nature.
3. Compare each of the comparable properties' important attributes to
the corresponding ones of the property being appraised, under the
general categories of time, location, physical characteristics, and
conditions of sale.
4. Consider all dissimilarities and their probable effect on the price of
each sale property to derive individual market value indications for
the property being appraised.
5. From the pattern developed, formulate
an opinion of market value
39
for the property being appraised. 1
This approach is particularly significant as "an expression of the value
established by actions of buyers and sellers in the market."" Itdoes
have its limitations, however. These include such factors as a lack of
provision for valuation in the absence of an active market, the greater
imposition of subjectiveness as properties differ more from each other
(no two properties are ever exactly alike, as they must differ at least as
133. Id. at 22-23.
134. See D.HAGMAN & J. JUERoENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 611-12; THE APPRAISAL OF REAL
ESTATE, supra note 129, at 65.
135. THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 129, at 65.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 158-164.
Id.
Id. at65, 68-71, ch. 15.
Id. at 274.
id. at 71.
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to location), and the inability to quantify many motivations driving buyers
and sellers.' 4'
The cost approach 42 determines value by estimating the depreciated 43
reproduction cost of improvements and adding to that the estimated value
of the land.'" Five steps lead to the fair market value:
I. Estimate the cost to reproduce (or replace) the basic improvements,
new.
2. Estimate the dollar amount of accrued depreciation due to:
a. Physical deterioration,
b. Functional obsolescence, and
c. Adverse economic influences
3. Deduct the total amount of accrued depreciation from cost new to
derive the present depreciated cost of the basic improvements.
4. By the same or similar procedure, estimate the present depreciated
cost of other improvements (minor structures or land improvements)
excepting any that were included in the land value estimate.
5. Add the land estimate to the depreciated cost of basic and other
improvements to arrive at a value indication by the cost approach.,45
The principal of substitution is the basis for this approach. " This theory
posits that no prudent buyer would pay more for an existing property

than the cost of reproducing a similar property at another site. 47 Accord-

ingly, land cost plus reproduction cost for a new structure, before dis-

counting for depreciation, usually sets the upper limit of value on any
property. 48
141. Id. at 70.
142. The cost approach has caused some difficulty for the courts in recent years. See United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1983); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506 (1978). While the Supreme Court has established fair market value as the standard for just
compensation, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, it seems to have equated market value
only with the market data approach, when, in fact, the market data approach, the cost approach,
and the income approach are all accepted appraisal methods for determining fair market value, see
text accompanying supra notes 134-137; infra text accompanying notes 158-164. Justice Stevens
almost acknowledged this point in 50Acres of Land when he noted that replacement cost, discounted
for the superiority of a new facility, "may amount to nothing more than a roundabout method of
arriving at the market value of the condemned facility ... Indeed, one might infer from the record
that this would be the result," at 35 & n.22.
143. Depreciation refers to any deficiency or disadvantage present in an existing building, as
compared to a new structure. THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 129, at 67, ch. 13. Accrued
depreciation includes physical depreciation, as caused by wear and tear and deterioration; functional
obsolescence, or inadequacy of desirable utility, style, or design as compared to current standards
and innovations; and economic or environmental obsolescence, resulting from influences external
to the property, such as changing property or land uses and adverse economic climate. Id. at 25152.
144. id. at 65, 66-68, ch. 14.
145. Id. at 263.
146. Id. at 263-64.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 264.
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The cost approach is particularly useful in the valuation of public and
'
special use properties for which no or little rental or sales market exists. 49
Its implementation, however, can be highly subjective' because of the
importance of accrued depreciation in the final determination, especially
in the case of older structures. 5 ' Any estimation of depreciation is greatly
dependent on the experience and judgement of the appraiser.'52
The income approach is the third method of determining fair market
value. It determines value based on a capitalization of net income projected to flow from the property.' 53 Seven steps lead to the fair market
value:
I. Estimate potential gross income.
2. Estimate and deduct a vacancy and collection loss allowance to
derive effect [sic] gross income.
3. Estimate and deduct expenses of operation to derive net operating
income (net income before recapture).
4. Estimate remaining economic life or the duration and pattern of the
projected income stream.
5. Select an applicable capitalization method and technique.
6. Develop the appropriate [capitalization] rate or rates.
7. Complete the necessary computations to derive an economic value
indication by the income approach.

'""

This approach is relevant only with regard to income-producing rental
property.' It is particularly useful in this context, however, as the investor
is "in effect trading a sum of present dollars for the right to a stream of
future dollars" to be generated by the property."'s Thus, it is based on
the principle of anticipation and through capitalization of future income
potential establishes fair market value as present capital value.' 57
The final step in the appraisal process of property is the reconciliation
of the values indicated by the three approaches, market data, cost, and
income.' These figures are not merely averaged,' 59 but are examined
according to the relative merit of each,"' ° considering these factors:
1. The reliability of data used.
149. Id.
150. Justice Stevens specifically noted this fact in United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S.
24, 35 (1983).
151. THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 129, at 68.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 65, 71-72, ch. 17.
154. Id. at 320-21.
155. Id. at 72.
156. Id. at 315.
157. Id. at 323.
158. Id. at 72-73, ch. 25.
159. Id. at 72.
160. Id. at 506.
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2. The applicability of the approach to the type of property being
appraised.
3. The applicability of the approach in the light of the definition of
value sought.' 6'
In determining fair market value, the estimates obtained by the three
approaches are weighed with regard to their "dependability as a reflection
of the probable actions of users and investors in the market." 62 The final
conclusion of fair market value, depending on the particular circumstances, may equal that of one of the initial estimates or be an adjusted
figure based on the weighting of each. 63 This final figure "reflects appraisal
judgement[,]. . . the applicability of the factual data on which it is based[,
and] . . . the knowledge and experience of the appraiser in interpreting
the data. 64
THE COMPENSABLE REGULATORY TAKING AND
FIRST LUTHERAN CHURCH
In 1957, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale (hereinafter the church) purchased twenty-one acres in the Angeles National
Forest, California, twelve acres of which are flat land along the banks
of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek. 65 The property, known as Lutherglen,
included various buildings and structures along the creek, and was used
by the church as a retreat center and recreation area for handicapped
children.
In July 1977, fire deforested 3,860 acres of the watershed
upstream from Lutherglen. 67 Eleven inches of rain fell on February 9
and 10, 1978, causing serious flooding along the creek and destroying
the buildings at Lutherglen.'" On January 11, 1979, the County of Los
Angeles, in response to the flooding, adopted Interim Ordinance No.
11,855, forbidding the construction of buildings within an interim flood
protection area designated along Mill
Creek." 6 Lutherglen was located
71
area.
within this flood protection
Less than two months after adoption of the ordinance, the church
161. Id.
162. Id. at 507,
163. Id.
164. Id.at 509.
165. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2381 (1987).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2390, 2381-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting App. 49). Specifically, the ordinance
prohibited "the construction, reconstruction, placement or enlargement of any building or structure
within any portion of the interim flood protection area... and shall take immediate effect." Id. at
2392 n.6 (Stevens, L., dissenting) (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 31-32).
170. Id. at 2382.
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brought suit in the Superior Court of California against the county and
the Los Angeles County Flood Control District.' 7' The subsequently amended
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the ordinance denied the church all use
of Lutherglen"' and sought damages for loss of use of the property.' In
198 1, after initiation of the suit, the county passed a permanent ordinance
banning development. 74
'In analyzing the facts of FirstLutheran Church with regard to current
compensable regulatory taking theory, four issues are addressed:
1. Is there a taking of private property?
2. If so, is the taking for public use?
3. If so, is there any justification for taking that private property?
4. If not, what compensation is due?7 .
Is There a Taking of Private Property?
In FirstLutheran Church the Supreme Court held that compensation,
not invalidation, is the remedy for a temporary regulatory taking of property through excessive land-use regulation.'6 The questions of whether
the ordinance at issue actually worked a taking and, if there was a taking,
whether it was justifiable were explicitly avoided. ' The Court did, however, validate the modern theory of permanent and temporary regulatory
takings. 7 ' It is within this framework that First Lutheran Church is
discussed.
As there is clearly no physical invasion or occupation of the property
involved in FirstLutheran Church, the per se regulatory taking test' 79 is
171. Id.
172. Id. This allegation was part of the church's first claim against defendants, alleging liability
under Cal. Gov't Code § 835 (West 1980) because the dangerous conditions on their upstream
properties contributed to the flooding of Lutherglen. The second claim sought damages in inverse
condemnation and tort against the Flood District for seeding the clouds during the storm.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2384 n.7. This ordinance provides that '[a] person shall not use, erect, construct,
move onto, or ... alter, modify, enlarge or reconstruct any building or structure within the boundaries
of a flood protection district except ... [aiccessory buildings and structures that will not substantially
impede the flow of water, including sewer, gas, electrical, and water systems, approved by the
county engineer. . . [ajutomobile parking facilities incidental to a lawfully established use . .. [and
f]lood-control structures approved by the chief engineer of the Los Angeles County Flood Control
District.' County Code § 22.44.220." Id. (quoting App. to Juris. Statement A32-A33).
While the ordinance allows for construction of "accessory" buildings and structures, these must
be "subordinate [or] incidental to... the main building[s]." Appellant's Reply to Motion to Dismiss
or Affirm, First Lutheran Church, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (No. 85-1199) (1987) (quoting Los Angeles Co.
Code § 22.08.010). As the church cannot reconstruct any main buildings, the allowance for accessory
structures is meaningless. Id.
175. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note I, at 31.
176. 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
177. Id. at 2384-85 (footnote omitted).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 25-50.
179. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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inapplicable. Thus, the facts must be examined according to existing
regulatory takings standards.o Factors considered by the Court include
economic impact,' the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations, 8 2 and a comparison of the value taken to the value remaining
in the property.'83
Although the church is a non-profit organization and, presumably,
conducted its activities at Lutherglen without a profit motive, it certainly
expected to be able to use the property in which it invested. The development ban, in effect, denies the church of substantially all, if not all,
use of Lutherglen. Therefore, the regulation has a definite adverse economic impact on the church, with Lutherglen now being of little, if any,
value to anyone except the County Flood Control District. Indeed, it is
arguable that Lutherglen is condemned "to use as a de facto part of the
Mill Creek Channel." 84
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the church suffered, at the least,
a temporary regulatory taking of its property. The passage of the permanent ordinance appears to transform the temporary taking into a permanent taking. Indeed, the church now has been denied use of Lutherglen
for over nine years.
Is the Taking for Public Use?
The Just Compensation Clause explicitly requires that a taking be for
public use.8 5 Although the Court restricts itself to limited review of
legislative determination of public interest,' 6 it maintains that there
must
8
be sufficient nexus between land-use regulation and public use.',
Flood control, in promoting public health, safety, and welfare, is unarguably within the police power of government.' The taking of Lutherglen, then, is for public use. Additionally, the development ban imposed
by the regulation is directly related to the public use. Therefore, First
Lutheran Church meets the public use requirements.
Is There Justification for the Taking?
This issue is unquestionably the most difficult in FirstLutheran Church.8 9
180. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.

181. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
182. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
183. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987).
184. Appellant's Brief at 47, First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (No. 85-1199).

185. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
186. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S, 26, 32 (1954).
187. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
188. See supra note 2.

189. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86.
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The existence of extreme emergency, particularly during war or under
warlike conditions, can justify takings."9° The same is true of regulation
controlling public nuisance."'9 As the dissent in First Lutheran Church
so vigorously asserted, in the exercise of the police power to control
public nuisance and protect health and safety, "government may condemn
unsafe structures, . . . close unlawful business operations, . . .destroy
infected trees, and ... restrict access to hazardous areas-for example,
land on which radioactive materials have been discharged, land in the
path of a lava flow from an erupting volcano, or land in the path of a
potentially life-threateningflood."192
The question is one of degree. While the police power can justify
taking without compensation, it is not an unrestricted justification, for if
it were so interpreted the Just Compensation Clause would be subsumed.' 93 The Court rejected such a fate for regulatory takings in First
LutheranChurch, without ruling on the merits. ' Thus, the issue becomes
whether the police power, as exercised in regulation banning development
in the interest of flood control, justifies the uncompensated taking of
property. The problem is one of establishing some limits on police power
justification to maintain the integrity of the Just Compensation Clause.
The church, by developing its own property, would not create a public
nuisance. It would not engage in invasive conduct to the detriment of its
neighbors. Notwithstanding the dissent, the exercise of the police power
in First Lutheran Church does not justify the taking of Lutherglen.
"[Pirevention of misfortunes of nature is not the same as the prevention
of wrongs by the property owner[, and t]he prevention of acts of God
does not lie within the police power, even if it satisfies the public use
limitation.' ' 9 5 If the government wants to use Lutherglen as a flood
channel, it may do so, but it must pay for that use to meet its constitutional
obligations.
What Compensation Is Due?
Assuming that the Court were to find that Lutherglen has been taken
for public use without justification, determination of just compensation
190. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, supra note 2, at 409-10 (citing Nat'l Bd. of Young
Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969); United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, (1952)).
191. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
192. First Lutheran Church. 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2391-92 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis
added). Justice Stevens was joined in this part of his dissent by Justice Blackmun and Justice
O'Connor.
193. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 109.
194. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
195. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 124.
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remains.,'" As "'temporary' takings which.., deny a landowner all use
of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings,"' 97 so
determination of compensation for temporary takings is not different in
kind from permanent takings.' 98 What is required is that the church be
paid for the value of the use of the land during the taking.'"
While appraisal of value is not an easy or simple process, the Court
already has experience in valuing temporary governmental use and occupation of private property.' The same approaches that are used to establish fair market sales value for a permanent taking2 °' are available to
determine fair market rental value or valuation of partial interests 2 for
a temporary or partial taking. Thus, if the regulation is rescinded and the
church is to be paid for a temporary taking or if the government elects
to retain the development ban and pay for a permanent taking, methods
are available to establish just compensation.'0
CONCLUSION
The FirstLutheran Church decision' rejuvenates the concept of regulatory taking' and confirms the theory of the compensable temporary
regulatory taking.' °6 Questions remain, including threshold issues, such
as what standards result in a regulatory taking 7 and when exercise of
the police power justifies an uncompensated taking, 0 8 and remedy issues
of what constitutes the form and the measure of just compensation. 2'
The Supreme Court has clearly held, however, that exercise of the police
power through excessive regulation can constitute a taking that must be
compensated, even if later invalidated and even if resulting only in a
temporary taking.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 87-164.
197. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987).
198. See Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the
"Gang ofFive's" Views on Just Compensationfor Regulatory Taking ofProperty, 19 LoY. L.A.L.
REv. 685, 745 n.282 (1986) [hereinafter Reply to The White River JunctionManifesto] (Mr. Berger
was counsel for petitioner in First Lutheran Church.).
199. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
200. Id. at 2387-88; Reply to The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 198, at 745 n.
282.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 134-164.
202. THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 129, at ch. 23.
203. Reply to The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 198, at 745 n. 282.
204. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
205. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
206. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,636 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
207. See text accompanying notes 51-63 and 176-184.
208. See text accompanying notes 75-86 and 185-195.
209. See text accompanying notes 87-164 and 196-203.
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LAND-USE REGULATION

The Court itself acknowledges that its decision "will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations." 2 Such is the price to be paid in upholding the constitutional
rights of property owners2" by placing the burden for public improvement
with the public, rather than the individual."'
While this decision may have a "chilling" effect on government," 3
that argument is somewhat suspect. In the first place, public officials
214
"have a duty to consider the constitutional consequences of their acts."
The real issue is one of "governmental responsibility and protection of
the rights of individuals." 2" 5 Secondly, "land use decisions are not made
in a vacuum";" 6 they are made deliberately, usually after long study and
public hearings.2" 7 Thus, if government decides it is in the public interest
to implement regulation, often over the objections of the regulated, "it
is not 'unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close
to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line."" Additionally, if the threat of monetary liability is "chilling" to
government, the corresponding adverse economic effect on the individual
property owner must be truly devastating. 1 9
Finally, the concept itself "rests on the idea that rights protected by
the Constitution are so precious that they require judicial protection not
only from outright invasions, but also from governmental activities which,
though not crudely violative of the constitutional letter, would in practice
erode those cherished rights." 2 0 Thus, the use of "chilling," "which
22
demands that constitutional values . . . be narrowly circumscribed," '
210. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
211. id.
212. See id. "A strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
213. E.g., The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 29, at 237.
214. Reply to The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 198, at 750 (citing Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980)); cf. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 & n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in quoting Longtin, Avoiding
and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation),
in 38B NIMLO MUN. L. REV. -,
192-93 (1975), Justice Brennan strongly implies that if public
officials do not have a responsibility to address the constitutionality of their official acts, they should
have, and compensation must be paid for unconstitutional land-use regulations.).
215. Reply to The White River Junction Manifesto. supra note 198, at 750.
216. Id. at 751.
217. Id. at 751-52.
218. id. at 752 (quoting Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)
(footnote omitted). Accord Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980)).
219. Reply to The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 198, at 745.
220. Id. at 752.
221. Id.
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to describe the effect on government action that itself threatens the constitutional rights of individuals, inverts societal values by suggesting "that
constitutional violations should be encouraged, lest their discouragement
work a 'chilling' of those who would set out on a path of collision with

the nation's organic law. "222

It is only fitting to conclude with the "compensation syllogism": 2' 3
Any constitutional taking of property requires just compensation.
An excessive land use regulation, like a physical taking, is a constitutional taking of property.
Therefore, an excessive land use regulation requires compensation.
NANCY ACKERMANN

222. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
223. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491,498
(1981) (arguing against the validity of the author's syllogism), accord The White River Junction
Manifesto, supra note 29, at 197 n.22. Contra Reply to The While River Junction Manifesto, supra
note 198, at 719-20. Ironically, the Supreme Court's ruling in First Lutheran Church confirms the
validity of Professor Mandelker's syllogism.

